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THE OBLIGATION OF LEGAL AID LAWYERS
TO CHAMPION PRACTICE BY NONLAWYERS
Deborah J. Cantrell*
INTRODUCTION
There is a familiar jeremiad of many who advocate for better access
to legal services. It is that more people would receive legal services if
there were changes to the laws, court rules, and regulations
concerning unauthorized practice of law ("UPL").' Most reformers
call for refinements to existing laws and regulations to create a
licensing scheme so that paraprofessionals and nonlawyer
professionals can qualify to perform certain tasks currently handled
solely by lawyers.2 Others have suggested that restrictions on who
may provide legal services should be abandoned and replaced with a
system where all may provide services, with only licensed lawyers
being able to hold themselves out as such.' It is notable that the most
sustained calls for reform have come in academic forums.4
* Clinical Lecturer of Law; Director of the Arthur Liman Public Interest Program,
Yale Law School. My sincere thanks to Sheila Nagaraj for her research assistance and
to Gene Coakley of the Yale Law School Library who found even the most hidden
sources. Thanks also to Deborah Rhode and Gary Blasi for their thoughts and
comments.
1. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice 79-102 (2004) [hereinafter
Rhode, Access to Justice]; Ralph C. Cavanagh & Deborah L. Rhode, Project, The
Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An Empirical Analysis, 86 Yale
L.J. 104 (1976); Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 209 (1990) [hereinafter Rhode, Delivery]; Deborah L. Rhode,
Professionalism in Perspective: Alternative Approaches to Nonlawyer Practice, 22
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 701 (1996) [hereinafter Rhode, Professionalism in
Perspective]; see also Reference Staff of the Fordham Law Sch. Library, Bibliography
to the Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services to Low-Income Persons:
Professional and Ethical Issues, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2731, 2737-42 (1999) [hereinafter
Bibliography].
2. See, e.g., Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 1, at 90-91.
3. See Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding
Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1229, 1269-70 (1995).
4. Deborah Rhode's pro se divorce project while a law student in the early 1970s
is an example of one of the early calls for reform. See Cavanagh & Rhode, supra note
1; see also Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective, supra note 1, at 702-04 (describing
the genesis for Rhode's pro se divorce project). To see the predominance of
academic reform voices, see Bibliography, supra note 1. There is at least one
consumer group whose purpose is to challenge UPL restrictions. See HALT - An
Org. of Ams. for Legal Reform, Major Reform Projects, at
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Why has there not been a sustained call for reform in other forums
championed by lawyers for the poor? Legal aid lawyers see daily how
many people they are unable to help, while also knowing that many of
those who do not receive service could have been helped by
straightforward advocacy and assistance. Further, legal aid lawyers
speak regularly about their clients' lack of access to legal services or
lack of access to justice, but seldom consider UPL restrictions as
potent barriers for their clients.' This Essay reviews the case for
eliminating UPL restrictions, and then argues that legal aid lawyers
must take the lead in advocating for reform.
I. WHY THE MIDDLE ROAD IS NOT ENOUGH-THE CASE FOR
COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
RESTRICTIONS
As many have noted, the standard justification for UPL restrictions
is that the law is a complicated and specialized field not known well by
most consumers and not practiced well by those who do not complete
law school.6 Thus, in order to ensure that consumers get appropriate
legal services, only licensed lawyers should be authorized to provide
those services.7 The standard consumer protection justification may
be scrutinized from several angles.
First, is it accurate that those who do not complete law school
cannot competently practice the law? This Essay will consider the
empirical evidence on whether the advanced training received by
lawyers means that they are more competent at providing legal
services than nonlawyers without that training. Next, if it is true that
consumers cannot know the law well because it is a complicated and
specialized field, must they rely on some other indicator of
competency and must that indicator be a license to practice law?
http://www.halt.org/reform-projects/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2004) [hereinafter HALT].
Further, some state bar associations and legislatures have taken up lawyer regulation.
See, e.g., Rhode, Delivery, supra note 1 (discussing activity in California in the early
1990s).
5. See, e.g., Alan W. Houseman, Civil Legal Assistance for the Twenty-First
Century: Achieving Equal Justice for All, 17 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 369 (1998)
(providing extensive recommendations for integrating civil legal assistance for the
poor, noting the use of nonlawyers without discussing the role of UPL restrictions in
limiting those service providers); Deborah Perluss, Washington's Constitutional Right
to Counsel in Civil Cases: Access to Justice v. Fundamental Interest, 2 Seattle J. for
Soc. Just. 571 (2004) (noting the high level of need for legal services among poor
people in the State of Washington, but arguing that the solution is to recognize a right
to counsel in civil cases); Wayne Tanna, A Message from Our President, 8 Haw. Bar J.
25 (2004) (presenting the president of the Hawaii Bar Association's perception of a
high need for legal services among poor Hawaiians, but calling for more pro bono
work by members of the bar).
6. See, e.g., Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 1, at 83.
7. See, e.g., Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of
Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2581,
2593-97 (1999).
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Finally, is it true that UPL prosecutions are used to protect
consumers? If, instead, UPL prosecutions are used to protect
attorneys from competition, then attorneys must justify why they
warrant such protection. They cannot use consumer protection as
cover.
A. Who Can Hack the Work?
Arguments in favor of lawyer exclusivity are replete with
statements like the following by the Florida Supreme Court:
"Laymen's good faith efforts at what so often turn out to be inartfully
drawn wills, have over the centuries cause [sic] untold litigation,
needless expense and unjust results."' The statement is not buttressed
by specific examples or evidence, but instead relies on a broad,
unsupported assertion of nonlawyer misconduct to claim notable
damages. As Deborah Rhode has noted, opponents of nonlawyer
practice often rely on unsupported or anecdotal stories about the
misdeeds of nonlawyers and do not consider whether lawyers make
similar mistakes in similar volumes as nonlawyers.9 The question of
whether nonlawyers are as skilled as lawyers, at least as to some set of
tasks, is empirical and should be answered not with anecdotes, but
with appropriately-gathered data. Not surprisingly, attorneys and
their professional associations have not actively pushed for such
empirical research. Nonetheless, some research exists and it
demonstrates that nonlawyers are as competent as lawyers in
providing many kinds of services.
One of the earliest research studies was conducted by Deborah
Rhode and Ralph Cavanagh. 10 In the mid-1970s, they reviewed court
files in about 330 divorce cases in Connecticut, interviewed a subset of
the plaintiffs, and sent written questionnaires to plaintiffs' attorneys.11
They also interviewed slightly over ninety people who had used a do-
it-yourself divorce kit provided by a local nonprofit.12
Rhode and Cavanagh compared the court forms filled out by
attorneys with those filled out by pro se plaintiffs and found that while
both made occasional errors, the forms filled out by attorneys were
not significantly more accurate than those filled out by the pro se
plaintiffs. 13  They also investigated whether lawyers significantly
contributed to resolving issues such as division of property, alimony,
and child visitation. Over 60% of the interviewed plaintiffs reported
that they and their spouses had reached agreement on such issues
8. Florida Bar v. Stupica, 300 So. 2d 683, 687 (Fla. 1974).
9. Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective, supra note 1, at 708 & nn.26-27 (citing
to various bar-related publications describing instances of nonlawyer incompetence).
10. See generally Cavanagh & Rhode, supra note 1.
11. Id. at 117-18.
12. Id. at 121-22.
13. Id. at 123-28.
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without a lawyer's assistance.14 Further, Rhode and Cavanagh found
that the ancillary documents prepared by lawyers to cover issues such
as property or child visitation rarely included extra details not already
covered in the judicial decree. 5 Most fascinating, Rhode and
Cavanagh asked plaintiffs and their attorneys how involved the
attorneys were in client counseling and negotiations, and found
striking differences in each group's assessment of attorney
involvement.16 For example, the attorneys reported that they had to
negotiate property disputes in 60% of their cases whereas only 32% of
the plaintiffs reported that their attorneys had spent time negotiating
such a dispute.17 Similarly, attorneys reported substantially more
contact with their clients than their clients reported with the
attorneys."i Based on their research, Rhode and Cavanagh concluded
that, at least with regard to many divorces, lay people were as
competent as lawyers and that lawyers overestimated the importance
of their role in resolving the case.19
One can extrapolate from the Rhode/Cavanagh study that if many
pro se plaintiffs were able to competently complete their divorce
cases, then those cases involve skills that are not unique to lawyers.
Thus, this is an area of law in which nonlawyers could competently
practice. More importantly, as Rhode and Cavanagh also note, some
of those interviewed about using the do-it-yourself divorce kit
reported they did not go forward with the kit because they lacked
typing skills or a typewriter or found the forms intimidating.2" Had a
nonlawyer assistant been available to help with the kits, then more
people would have gone forward with them.
It is true that the Rhode/Cavanagh study provides empirical support
regarding only one type of legal matter-relatively straightforward
divorces. Nonetheless, one can identify other similar types of legal
matters where a nonlawyer could provide assistance, such as advanced
health care directives (particularly since many states have statutory
forms),2' or other areas involving form work. Further, the
Rhode/Cavanagh study makes clear that a complete ban on nonlawyer
assistance is not empirically supported.
More recently, in the late 1990s Herbert Kritzer studied lawyer and
nonlawyer advocates in four administrative settings to determine
14. Id. at 137-38.
15. Id. at 134-38.
16. Id. at 141-46.
17. Id. at 144.
18. Id. at 145-46.
19. Rhode and Cavanagh recognized that certain kinds of divorces clearly
benefited from a lawyer's involvement, including highly disputed divorces. Id. at 151.
20. Id. at 162-63.
21. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 19a-575a (West 2003).
[Vol. 73
2004] THE OBLIGATION OF LEGAL AID LAWYERS 887
whether one group performed better than the other.2 2  Kritzer
observed lawyers and nonlawyers who advocated in unemployment
compensation appeals, state tax commission appeals, social security
disability appeals, and labor grievance arbitrations, and he statistically
analyzed the outcomes in the cases.23 Kritzer hypothesized that the
most accurate predictors of competence would be the advocates'
levels of substantive knowledge of the area of law and procedural
knowledge about the particular administrative forum. 4 In other
words, the best advocates in each of the settings were likely to be
those people who were well versed in substance and who were repeat
players in the system. Kritzer's findings were in accord. 5
For example, in the unemployment compensation appeals Kritzer
observed, nonlawyer advocates included people such as union
officials, staff of company personnel departments, or nonlawyers who
work for businesses specializing in unemployment issues.2 6 Lawyer
advocates included independent counsel as well as in-house counsel of
employer-parties. 27 Kritzer's analysis demonstrated that
some expertise (e.g., in adversarial advocacy) is probably better than
none, but it is the combination of general advocacy skills, knowledge
of specific hearing practices and players (e.g., how the administrative
law judges run hearings), and substantive knowledge of...
unemployment compensation that characterizes the most effective
advocates. Formal training (in the law) is less crucial than is day-to-
day experience in the UC [unemployment compensation] setting.28
Kritzer made similar findings in the other administrative areas.29
Kritzer did note that lawyers seemed to be better able than
nonlawyers to "move across different settings"-that is, to use their
general knowledge about preparing and presenting evidence and to
work in multiple or unfamiliar forums.3° Nonetheless, Kritzer also
concluded that an experienced nonlawyer presenting in a forum
similar to where he or she typically worked remained a better
advocate than a lawyer experienced in trial work, but with little
background in the substantive law of the new forum.3' Kritzer's study
expands on the findings of Rhode and Cavanagh and suggests that
there may be many areas of substantive law and many kinds of
22. Herbert M. Kritzer, Legal Advocacy: Lawyers and Nonlawyers at Work
(1998).
23. Id. at 21-22.
24. Id. at 201.
25. Id. at 201-02.
26. Id. at 25.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 76.
29. Id. at 108 (tax appeals), 148 (social security disability appeals), 190 (labor
grievance arbitrations).
30. Id. at 201.
31. Id.
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advocacy forums in which nonlawyers are equally competent as
lawyers.
Given that many of the people without access to lawyers have low
or modest incomes, it would be useful to consider research that
focused on legal issues more common for those people. Researchers
in the United Kingdom have conducted a relevant study.32 First,
consider some background on the provision of legal services in the
United Kingdom. Since roughly 1994, nonlawyers have been able to
provide the same kinds of legal aid services as solicitors.33 Under the
United Kingdom's system, some basic legal services are provided to
all as part of the government's social services, with more extended
services available to those with lower incomes.34
Researcher Richard Moorhead and his colleagues compared legal
services provided by nonlawyers with similar services provided by
solicitors on cases involving welfare benefits, debt collection, housing,
and employment-all areas often involving clients with low or modest
incomes.35 They gathered data on the type of services provided and
their legal outcomes, surveyed clients, had the legal files scrutinized
by expert peer reviewers to assess the competency level of the
services, and sent "dummy clients" to visit legal services providers to
assess factors such as attitudes of the providers towards clients.36
Their analysis provided some striking results.
First, clients reported that the nonlawyer providers were
significantly better thian solicitors in the following areas: knowing the
right people with whom to speak about the client's problem, paying
attention to the client's emotional concerns, listening to what the
client had to say, treating the client as if she or he mattered, taking
action that the client wished, having enough time for the client, giving
the client information on what would happen in the case, and standing
up for the client's rights.37 While some of the above factors attempt to
measure the quality of services ("knowing the right people with whom
to speak"), many of the measures may disclose more about the style
used by the advocate and the client's comfort level with that style.
32. Richard Moorhead et al., Contesting Professionalism: Legal Aid and Non-
Lawyers in England and Wales, 37 Law & Soc'y Rev. 765 (2003) [hereinafter
Moorhead et al., Contesting Professionalism]; see also Richard Moorhead, The Rise of
Nonlawyers: Experience from England and Wales (2001), available at
http://www.ilagnet.org/conference/ilag2001.htm [hereinafter Moorhead, The Rise of
Nonlawyers].
33. Moorhead, The Rise of Nonlawyers, supra note 32, at 1; see also Moorhead et
al., Contesting Professionalism, supra note 32, at 773 ("Although, unlike in the United
States, there was and is no general prohibition on nonlawyers providing legal advice;
until the creation of the [Legal Aid] Board, funds for legal aid could only be provided
through solicitors' firms and law centers employing solicitors or barristers.").
34. Moorhead et al., Contesting Professionalism, supra note 32, at 772.
35. Id. at 777.
36. Id. at 777-82.
37. Id. at 785.
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Thus, Moorhead and his colleagues also compared the outcomes
received by clients served by nonlawyers and those served by
solicitors.
The researchers found that in those cases where a concrete result
was achieved (as compared to those solely involving legal advice),
nonlawyers were significantly more likely to achieve a concrete result
than were solicitors.38 For example, "the likelihood of a solicitor
getting a positive financial result in a welfare benefit case was about a
quarter of the likelihood of a nonlawyer."39 The only area in which
nonlawyers did not outperform solicitors was housing. 40 Furthermore,
when expert peer reviewers assessed competency of services, more
solicitors than nonlawyers had cases in which their service was ranked
as poor.4' Controlling for certain factors related to peer review scores,
the researchers found "that where the case was handled by a
solicitor's firm, rather than an NFP [nonlawyer] agency, the likelihood
of a case being assessed as below threshold competence increased
markedly, and conversely, such cases were far less likely to be
assessed at above threshold competence.
42
Finally, Moorhead and co-authors assessed whether nonlawyers and
solicitors differed in the advocacy methods they chose. In other
words, did nonlawyers focus on "lower-level" work and avoid
advocacy methods involving litigation even if that would be best for
the client?43 This review was designed to assess whether solicitors,
because of more advanced training, provided a wider range of services
to their clients, thus offering more comprehensive services than
nonlawyers. The researchers found no differences in advocacy
methods in certain types of cases such as welfare benefits which, if
there is litigation, are heard in front of administrative tribunals that
permit appearances by nonlawyers.44 In contrast, in housing cases,
which proceed in court if there is litigation, a venue in which
nonlawyers are barred, nonlawyers were less likely to take adversarial
cases than solicitors.45 Moorhead and his colleagues concluded that
any differences in advocacy methods between nonlawyers and
solicitors were as likely the result of structural barriers as of differing
competency levels.46
In coming to a final analysis about their empirical work, Moorhead
and his co-authors concluded (similar to Kritzer):
38. Id. at 786-87.
39. Id. at 787.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 788.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 791.
44. Id. at 792.
45. Id. at 792-93.
46. Id. at 793 (citation omitted).
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The professional model of service does not always provide higher
levels of service than the paraprofessional in the sphere of
operations examined in this study. The control on entry into legal
practice, years of legal education, and regulation of conduct and
competence have done little or nothing to distinguish the lawyers
from their nonlawyer competitors. Other empirical evaluations in
different contexts tend also to question the supposed supremacy of
lawyers; it is specialization, not Srofessional status, which appears to
be the best predictor of quality.
There are three particularly compelling features of the Moorhead
research: first, the breadth of services that were examined; second,
that the areas of service often included people with low and modest
incomes; and third, that multiple methods were used to measure
competency. If the legal profession has grudgingly accepted
nonlawyer assistance, it has generally been along the lines of "if we
must have nonlawyers, then they can only work in this very limited
capacity."48  However, Moorhead and his co-authors' research
establishes that nonlawyers are competent to provide services in a
range of both substantive areas and advocacy methods. Nonlawyers
competently worked in all of the substantive areas in which legal aid
was provided, and competently provided services that ranged from
legal advice and counseling to litigation. Further, nonlawyers
outperformed solicitors in achieving a concrete outcome for a client
and in making the client feel comfortable and informed about the
legal matter.
Importantly, the clients in the study often had problems similar to
those faced by low-income clients in the United States such as
maintaining welfare benefits and housing. While the particular
eligibility requirements or legal criteria are certainly different
between the two countries, the Moorhead study confirms that
nonlawyer advocates are comfortable with, and skilled at working
with, those who may be less sophisticated about the law. Similarly,
those clients report a high level of satisfaction with nonlawyer
advocates, especially in terms of non-legal needs such as emotional
support and good levels of communication.
Further, while the Moorhead study was conducted on a professional
system that is different than that in the United States, the systemic
differences are modest enough that the study's results remain relevant
to discussions about nonlawyer practice in the United States. For
47. Id. at 795.
48. For example, some states permit nonlawyers to assist in preparing forms
related to real estate purchases. See, e.g., State Bar v. Guardian Abstract Title Co.,
575 P.2d 943 (N.M. 1978); Cultur v. Heritage House Realtors, Inc., 694 P.2d 630
(Wash. 1985) (en banc). Some states have also expanded nonlawyer assistance work
in areas in which parties regularly appear pro se. For examples, see Alex J. Hurder,
Nonlawyer Legal Assistance and Access to Justice, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2241, 2241-42
(1999).
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example, students in the UK may study law as an undergraduate
degree. However, to qualify as a solicitor a student must complete a
post-graduate year in a legal practice course and then two further
years in training at a solicitor's office. 49 Thus, solicitors have a similar
kind of advanced training as do American lawyers (in fact, those
wanting to be solicitors have more job-specific training than do
American law students). It is clear from the Moorhead study that
such advanced training in itself does not make lawyers better
practitioners than nonlawyers.
B. Is a License to Practice Law the Most Relevant Piece of
Information to Consumers When Choosing a Legal Advisor?
As noted above, one component of the justification for UPL
restrictions is that the law is a specialized and complicated body of
knowledge that the average consumer will not readily understand.
Thus, the consumer will not be able to determine in advance what
specific kinds of legal services are needed, and when picking a legal
advisor will have to rely instead on an easily understood marker about
the advisor's qualifications. According to the argument, a license to
practice law is the best marker of good qualifications and it would be
too hazardous for consumers to have to sift through varying
alternative kinds of information about qualifications.
However, as others have noted, that rationale is both inaccurate
and simplistic.5 0  Many consumers are sophisticated and highly
knowledgeable about their legal needs. For example, a financial
planner likely understands the basic contours of estate law and the
conditions under which tax-planned legal documents like a trust are
appropriate. That consumer will be able both to assess the need for a
lawyer's involvement and look to the particular qualifications of a
lawyer when deciding who to retain. The consumer will consider
whether she has substantial enough assets that her estate would owe
an estate tax. If yes, the consumer will consider whether the lawyer
has experience drafting trusts that deal with such issues as the unified
estate and gift tax credit and generation-skipping taxes. For the
expert consumer, the least relevant information is that the lawyer is
licensed.
For those consumers who are less knowledgeable, they are in no
different position searching for legal services than they are when
searching for other services or goods such as a reliable home
improvement contractor or the best internet service provider. In
those situations, consumers look for more information about the
provider than whether the provider is licensed. The consumer
49. See Roger Burridge, Legal Education in the United Kingdom, at
http://www.aals.org/2OOOinternational/english/uk.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2004).
50. See Pearce, supra note 3, at 1267.
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considering a home contractor generally looks for references and
other evidence that the contractor has timely finished other projects.
Similarly, the consumer looking for a lawyer would like some
information about the kind of legal practice primarily handled by the
lawyer, and may also want some references. It is not enough for the
consumer to know that the lawyer is licensed. Consumers are able to
look for and understand markers of competency beyond the simple
fact of licensing.
C. Are UPL Prosecutions Used to Protect Consumers?
The final component of the consumer justification for UPL
restrictions is that UPL prosecutions are, in fact, used to protect
consumers and the corollary argument that UPL prosecutions are, in
fact, good at protecting consumers. That issue, like the question of
lawyer-nonlawyer competency, is an empirical one. Again, Deborah
Rhode has conducted important research in this area.51
Rhode conducted a tripartite inquiry, including a review of all
reported UPL cases concerning nonlawyers between 1970 and 1980, a
survey of state administrative agencies to assess whether any
permitted nonlawyer representation, and a survey of every state
authority charged with policing UPL to assess what actual
prosecutorial work occurred.52 Rhode found that only 2% of the
complaints reviewed in her survey were initiated by injured
consumers.53 That was true even though most of the UPL complaints
concerned "form preparation and related advice" 5n-an area which
courts and professional associations have said was ripe for abuse of
consumers by nonlawyers55 Furthermore, only 11% of the complaints
reviewed involved allegations of specific harm by nonlawyers1
6
Rhode's findings that most UPL complaints deal with alleged
misbehavior of lawyers and that very few complaints are filed by
aggrieved consumers, suggests that UPL complaints are not used by
consumers as a protective measure. Further, most complaints are not
about nonlawyer misconduct. Thus, UPL restrictions are certainly not
primarily used to protect consumers from nonlawyer activities.
Nonetheless, Rhode did find that most complaints related to form
preparation. If form preparation is considered a straightforward legal
service akin to a basic consumer service, then UPL prosecutions
targeting attorneys who incompetently assisted their clients in filling
51. Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1981)
[hereinafter Rhode, Policing the Profession].
52. Id. at 11-15.
53. Id. at 43.
54. Id. at 30.
55. See supra Part I.A.
56. Rhode, Policing the Profession, supra note 51, at 43.
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out forms might be justified as a means of consumer protection.
Interestingly, Rhode's interviews of state personnel charged with
policing UPL revealed that almost 50% of them perceived the general
public as skeptical about whether UPL restrictions were used to
protect consumers rather than as a tool to protect attorneys.57 Thus,
enforcement personnel recognized that consumers did not agree that
lawyers policed themselves in order to protect consumers.
Turning to the corollary of whether UPL prosecutions are a good
tool for consumer protection, it might be helpful to think of an
exemplary case such as that of the "notario." Several commentators
have detailed stories about unscrupulous nonlawyers who offer poor-
quality legal services to immigrants .5  The nonlawyers often work
under the name "notario" because in many Latin American countries
"notario" means lawyer. 9  Thus, Spanish-speaking immigrant
consumers mistakenly believe they are receiving services from a
lawyer. Since every state's UPL regime prohibits nonlawyers from
giving independent legal advice, UPL prosecutions would seem to be
a good method to use to protect those immigrant consumers.6"
However, a review of some of the cases against notarios reveals that
states (generally through attorney general offices) have often
prosecuted those cases using other more potent tools such as criminal
law or statutes barring the use of the phrase "notario."' 61 Similarly,
instead of relying on UPL restrictions, disgruntled consumers have
challenged nonlawyer misconduct using civil claims such as trademark
infringement, false advertising, and state consumer protection
statutes.62
Consumers and their advocates have used methods other than UPL
prosecutions because remedies in UPL cases are often weaker than
those available under general criminal or civil law. For example, in
most states the harshest sanction for UPL is a misdemeanor
conviction.63  UPL restrictions do not provide consumers with
minimum damages or attorneys' fees as do many states' consumer
protection statutes.' 4 Further, by using a civil action rather than a
UPL prosecution, consumers retain control over the litigation rather
57. Id. at 39-40.
58. See, e.g., Anne E. Langford, What's in a Name?: Notarios in the United States
and the Exploitation of a Vulnerable Latino Immigrant Population, 7 Harv. Latino L.
Rev. 115 (2004).
59. Rhode, Policing the Profession, supra note 51 at 31-32.
60. For a discussion of states' UPL restrictions and definitions, see Denckla, supra
note 7, at 2581, 2585-92.
61. Langford, supra note 58, at 128-31.
62. See Complaint, Legal Aid Found. of L.A. v. Cal. Law Clinic (Cal. Super. Ct.
2003) (No. BC307009) (copy of complaint on file with author); see also Donna S.
Harkness, Packaged and Sold: Subjecting Elder Law Practice to Consumer Protection
Laws, 11 J.L. & Pol'y 525, 538-53 (2003).
63. Rhode, Policing the Profession, supra note 51, at 11.
64. Harkness, supra note 62, at 536-37.
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than ceding control to the state personnel charged with prosecuting
UPL. In sum, UPL restrictions are not the most effective tool for
consumer protection.
Having considered the various facets of the consumer protection
justification for UPL restrictions, the empirical data supports several
conclusions: (1) nonlawyers can competently provide similar kinds of
services as lawyers, (2) a license to practice law is not the most
relevant indicator of competency, and (3) UPL restrictions constitute
a blunt instrument, at best, for protecting consumers. Thus, it is
inappropriate for the legal profession to justify UPL restrictions on
the grounds of consumer protection. If nonlawyers can competently
provide legal services, the issue becomes whether UPL restrictions
should be entirely eliminated or whether the r should be replaced with
some sort of nonlawyer licensing scheme.
Russell Pearce has convincingly argued that UPL restrictions
should be abandoned.65 Instead, "[l]awyers and nonlawyers would be
able to provide legal services, but only those admitted to the bar
would be able to call themselves 'lawyers."' 66 All who provide legal
services would owe basic duties to their clients such as duties of
confidentiality and competence, and the government would prescribe
a set of ethical regulations covering all legal services providers.67
Pearce's system essentially is a notification system where consumers
could ask for information about a provider's training and experience
in determining whether to hire the provider. Consumers could rely on
existing legal remedies provided in tort and in consumer protection
statutes should their legal service provider inadequately handle the
legal matter.
Pearce's system substantially reduces costs for legal service
providers to enter the market, thereby increasing the kinds and
numbers of providers available to consumers at varying cost levels.
The one empirical question left open is whether the market would
provide sufficient levels of low-cost providers so that those consumers
currently priced out of the market would then be able to afford
services. Until UPL restrictions are abandoned, it will remain
uncertain how well the market will fill the current void in low-cost
legal services. However, that uncertainty should not be the reason
that justifies retaining the current system, which unquestionably fails
to provide a sufficient level of low-cost services.
Given that the legal profession, courts, and legislatures (often
lawyer-dominated) have been slow to deconstruct UPL restrictions,
what can be done to speed the course, and who should lead such an
effort?
65. Pearce, supra note 3, at 1269-70.
66. Id. at 1269.
67. Id. at 1270.
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II. THE CALL FOR LEGAL AID LAWYERS TO LEAD EFFORTS TO
REFORM UPL
Despite repeated calls by scholars to modify or eliminate UPL
restrictions, 68 similar advocacy efforts by consumer groups,69 ABA
commissions charged with studying UPL, °  and conference
recommendations supporting nonlawyer practice,71 there has been
only modest approval of work by nonlawyers7 2 At the same time,
there has been research showing a great amount of unmet legal needs
among those who cannot easily afford legal services-upwards of
four-fifths of the needs of the poor and two-thirds of the needs of
middle income individuals are unmet.73 There is also research
confirming an increase in the number of people (especially the poor)
being pressed to go forward pro se.74 Nonetheless, funding for civil
poverty lawyers has declined.75
No one understands the alchemy of the above better than legal aid
lawyers and their clients-too many people are left without any help
solving their legal problems. Legal aid lawyers have creatively
responded by developing innovative methods of delivering legal
services and crafting pro se assistance programs.76 But, legal aid
attorneys as a community have never made a substantive and focused
commitment to eliminating UPL restrictions as a possible solution to
their clients' unmet legal needs. For example, the National Legal Aid
and Defender Association, the overarching association for legal aid
lawyers, has never taken a formal position on UPL-either in support
or in opposition.77 If UPL restrictions are to be eliminated, it will
68. See Bibliography, supra note 1, at 2737-42.
69. See, e.g., HALT, supra note 4.
70. See, e.g., Comm'n on Nonlawyer Practice, ABA, Nonlawyer Activity in Law-
Related Situations: A Report with Recommendations (August 1995), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/nonlawyer.html.
71. See Recommendations of the Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services to
Low-Income Persons, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1751 (1999).
72. Some examples of nonlawyer practice include legal document assistants and
immigration consultants authorized by California statutes, see Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
§§ 6400, 22441 (West 2004), and bankruptcy preparers authorized by the federal
bankruptcy code. 11 U.S.C. § 110 (2000).
73. Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 1, at 3, 103.
74. Deborah J. Cantrell, Justice for the Interests of the Poor: The Problem of
Navigating the System Without Counsel, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 1573, 1582 (2002); see
also Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 1, at 82.
75. Cantrell, supra note 74, at 1575-76; see also Deborah J. Cantrell, A Short
History of Poverty Lawyers in the United States, 5 Loy. J. of Pub. Int. L. 11, 27-31
(2003) (giving an historical account of federal funding for civil legal services)
[hereinafter Cantrell, A Short History].
76. Cantrell, supra note 74, at 1581. But see Gary Blasi, How Much Access? How
Much Justice?, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 865, 867-69 (2004) (detailing his evaluation of a
self-help center for pro se tenants and his findings that tenants were still unlikely to
win).
77. Telephone Interview with Don Saunders, Director, Civil Legal Services of
NLADA (July 8, 2004). In contrast, when the ABA Taskforce on the Model
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happen only with the concerted, coordinated effort of a segment of
the bar such as legal aid lawyers. The fact that legal aid lawyers have
not challenged UPL restrictions is, one hopes, an unfortunate
oversight. One worries, however, that it is an indication that legal aid
lawyers are as protective (even if benevolently) as their private bar
counterparts. There is evidence supporting both conclusions.
A. The Evidence of Unfortunate Oversight
As noted above, legal aid lawyers, especially those working in
community-based offices,8 turn away clients every day. Those clients
need legal assistance in a multitude of substantive areas: housing,
government benefits, Medicaid, consumer fraud, divorce, and
domestic violence, among others.79 The clients understand their
problems in terms of negative legal consequences that will result if a
lawyer does not help them or take their case. In return, the lawyers,
well trained in their ethical duty of loyalty to a client, understand their
responsibilities in terms of reaching positive solutions for particular
clients. If Mrs. S. is about to be evicted, and her landlord has not
followed proper procedures, then the obvious course of conduct for
the lawyer is to focus on those procedural irregularities and gain more
time for Mrs. S. to either cure her rent default or find new housing.
Thus, in the press of everyday business in which problems are always
presented as individualized substantive legal matters, the impetus for
a legal aid lawyer is to focus on the substantive legal issues rather than
step back and analyze whether there is a more fundamental structural
problem.
This is not surprising. As law students, and then as practicing
lawyers, advocates generally think about the law along substantive
lines. Most classes at law school are taught along substantive lines:
torts, contracts, property, business organizations, and the like.
Definition of the Practice of Law solicited comments on its proposed definition, the
chair of the ABA's Standing Committee on the Delivery of Legal Services responded
that the only viable definition was one that barred nonlawyers from holding
themselves out to the public as lawyers because nonlawyers should be permitted to
provide legal services as a way of meeting the unmet needs of poor legal consumers.
Memorandum from Mary K. Ryan, Chair, Standing Committee on the Delivery of
Legal Services, to Lish Whitson, Chair, Taskforce on the Model Definition of the
Practice of Law (Dec. 19, 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/model-
def/scdls.pdf.
78. 1 use the phrase "community-based offices" to refer to those legal aid offices
that focus on providing direct legal services to poor clients, as contrasted with legal
aid offices that focus on systemic reform efforts. Many, but not all, community-based
offices receive federal funding from the Legal Services Corporation, while no office
focused on systemic reform does. See Cantrell, A Short History, supra note 75, at 27-
31; see also Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 1, at 62-64.
79. See New Haven Legal Assistance Ass'n, Home Page, at
http://www.nhlegal.org/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2004) (providing an example of the kinds
of legal assistance provided by a community-based office).
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Further, when lawyers go into practice, they often focus on a
particular substantive area, and that is true for legal aid lawyers as
well. Most legal aid offices are divided into substantive teams: the
benefits group, the health care group, the family law group, and the
housing group.8" There is no unit designed exclusively to reflect on
larger systemic and structural barriers of the legal system and there is
no time set aside at most programs to bring attorneys together across
substantive areas to consider systemic and structural barriers.
Further, for those programs receiving federal funding, the "'strong
Congressional message [since 1996 is that] federally funded legal
services should focus on individual case representation,"'8 creating an
incentive for community-based legal aid offices to see as many
individual clients as possible. Additionally, federally-funded
programs are charged with setting their work priorities by assessing
the needs of the community's clients. Many programs send written
surveys to their clients asking about those clients' legal needs. As one
would expect, clients often focus on their own individual substantive
problems and not structural problems.8" Thus, legal aid programs are
encouraged by their constituencies to focus on substantive legal issues,
not structural ones.
One also sees a focus on substantive law rather than structural
change in those legal aid offices which handle systemic reform
matters. For example, if one surveys a list of "support centers" (the
generic name given to legal aid offices that do not receive federal
funding and that focus on systemic litigation and legislative advocacy),
one sees that almost all of those organizations have a substantive law
focus. Some examples include the National Health Law Program, the
National Center for Youth Law, the National Immigration Law
Center, and the National Senior Citizens Law Center.83 To the extent
the support centers consider systemic reform, it is generally along
substantive lines, such as a class action lawsuit against the governor of
California to force the state to award a cost-of-living adjustment to the
state's welfare recipients.' Support centers show the same bias
toward substantive legal work as do community-based programs.
80. An example of this kind of structure can be seen at the Legal Aid Foundation
of Los Angeles. It has ten substantive units and each has a directing attorney.
LAFLA, Key Staff, at http://www.lafla.org/about/staff/index.asp (last visited Oct. 22,
2004) (listing the ten substantive units and their directing attorneys).
81. Rhode, Access to Justice, supra note 1, at 108 (quoting John McKay, then-
president of Legal Services Corporation).
82. Id. at 107-08.
83. Many of the support centers are located in California. See Pub. Interest
Clearinghouse, Directory of California and Nevada Legal Services Programs, at
http://www.pic.org/resx/direclsp.htm#N (last visited Oct. 22, 2004).
84. See First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate, Guillen v. Schwarzenegger
(Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 2004) (No. CPF-03-503797), available at
http://www.wclp.org/files/First%20amended%20petition%20.pdf. Plaintiffs' counsel
is Western Center on Law & Poverty, the largest state support center in California.
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Given that there are an enormous number of substantive legal
issues with which poor people need legal assistance, it is hard to fault
legal aid lawyers for focusing on those issues. It is certainly a good
result if a lawyer is able to help a family get its children back on
Medicaid or if a lawyer is able to change state legislation so that more
children are eligible for Medicaid. Nonetheless, it would be an even
better result if seven families were able to get their children back on
Medicaid because they went to their community center and met with a
nonlawyer advocate who provided the same services as the legal aid
lawyer. Legal aid lawyers need to more forcefully press for regulatory
and statutory changes to support that nonlawyer advocate.85
B. The Evidence for Protectionism
One response of legal aid lawyers to suggestions that their clients
should receive services by methods other than direct lawyer assistance
is to assert that their clients are not second-class citizens and are
entitled to the same kinds of services as more wealthy people. Few
would dispute that an ideal world would mean that anyone who
wanted a lawyer could have a lawyer, just as anyone who wanted a
doctor could have a doctor. But, it is unhelpful to propose an ideal
world as the only acceptable solution when the political, financial, and
structural realities make clear that an ideal world is not achievable.
As Lucie White has argued, "endorsing the principle of equal (i.e.,
elite) legal services for all people" may not be the best means for
promoting social equality. 6 White contends that advocates should
look at the social needs of the poor and other disenfranchised groups
"sui generis, in ways that reflect their own experiences of need, their
embedded historical and cultural realities, the societal power
landscapes from their perspectives, their capacities, and their
normative aspirations . 87 White's call goes well beyond legal aid
lawyers embracing nonlawyer advocates, but it underscores the need
for legal aid lawyers to challenge existing structural assumptions,
including the assumption that a lawyer knows best.
See Western Ctr. on Law and Poverty, Mission History, at
http://wclp.org/aboutwclp/missionhistory.php (last visited Oct. 22, 2004).
85. Again, some community-based legal aid programs have actively brought
paraprofessionals onto their staffs and utilize those advocates as much as they can.
One example is the Health Consumer Center of Los Angeles County Neighborhood
Legal Services. The Center runs a multilingual hotline staffed by paraprofessionals
who are overseen by an attorney. See Neighborhood Legal Servs., Special Projects, at
http://www.nls-la.org/specialprojects.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2004); see also Rhode,
Access to Justice, supra note 1, at 110-12 (discussing other reasons why legal aid
lawyers have been reluctant to expand services).
86. Lucie White, Specially Tailored Legal Services for Low-Income Persons in the
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Legal aid lawyers also argue that they, rather than nonlawyers,
should see clients because lawyers are better trained to detect less
obvious, but equally serious, ancillary legal problems. As described
by one of the lawyers interviewed by Herbert Kritzer: "'People don't
show up with a nice, simple legal problem in a small, neat box. They
usually show up with a legal problem with one or two cans tied on its
tail."'88 According to the argument, only lawyers, with their special
training and experience, are able to detect and deflect those
troublesome cans. Kritzer's research provided no support for that
argument. He did not find that most of the cases were more
complicated than they initially appeared, and he suggested that
nonlawyer specialists could "be more cognizant of the multiplicity of
attached 'cans' than would be a specialist lawyer brought in on a one-
shot or intermittent basis."89
Certainly it is true that there are easy, straightforward cases where
no specialized knowledge or skills are needed in order to accurately
assess the legal problem. Considering only those more complicated
cases, the question becomes whether legal aid lawyers have
demonstrated that they are more competent than others in identifying
the complications. There is evidence that they are not. For example,
legal aid attorneys have been criticized for not understanding or
identifying the collateral civil consequences of a guilty plea or
conviction.9" Similarly, civil legal aid lawyers have been criticized for
not understanding or seeking help to assess the social services needs
of a client.91 What becomes clear is that lawyers can have the same
level of difficulty spotting ancillary issues as can nonlawyers, and that
the best antidote is an integrated model of services where several
kinds of experts are asked to assess the client's needs.
Why is it that legal aid lawyers, who presumably choose public
interest law because of some sense of community service, still hold
tightly to the belief that lawyers are better at providing legal services?
One can see some interesting antecedents, both historically and
academically. Historically, one may look to the Office of Economic
Opportunity ("OEO"), the federal office established in 1964 to
coordinate federal funding for legal aid.92
In considering the means by which it was going to establish and
improve legal aid, the OEO determined that one important factor was
88. Kritzer, supra note 22, at 196.
89. Id.
90. McGregor Smyth, Bridging the Gap: A Practical Guide to Civil-Defender
Collaboration, 37 Clearinghouse Rev. 56 (2003); see also Tom Perrotta, Legal Aid
Tests New Style of Advocacy in Harlem, 37 Clearinghouse Rev. 519 (2004) (noting the
hostility of some legal aid lawyers to the idea of civil-defender collaboration).
91. Ellen Hemley, Representing the Whole Client, 36 Clearinghouse Rev. 483
(2003).
92. See Cantrell, A Short History, supra note 75, at 17.
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upgrading the qualifications of legal aid lawyers.93 The OEO wanted
to recruit bright, highly-qualified graduates from the elite law schools,
and created a fellowship program to support that effort.94 Under the
program, called the Reginald Heber Smith Community Lawyer
Fellowship Program, the fellows quickly became known as "Reggies"
and were placed throughout the country to help legal aid offices
become part of the new national network of poverty advocates. 95
While there are no longer "Reggie" fellows, the "Reggies" continue to
be revered among legal aid lawyers and are held as exemplars of what
it means to advocate for the poor.96
The use of Reggies helped create a sense of legal aid lawyers as
specially suited for advocacy on behalf of the poor. Those lawyers
were motivated by ideas such as equality or social justice and saw
their careers as having a purpose grander than that of making partner
in a law firm. 97 They saw their legal skills as the means by which to
bring about greater societal change. That sense of the grand power of
the law and the desire for great social change also likely fostered a
sense that only lawyers had the skills to carry out the resulting
strategies. Thus, in an effort to improve the quality of legal aid
attorneys, the OEO also fostered the idea that those lawyers are
specially qualified as advocates for the poor.
The legal academy has fostered a similar sense of specialness.
Regardless of where a student goes to law school, that student
becomes a member of an elite group upon entering.98 Law is not an
93. See Earl Johnson Jr., Justice and Reform: The Formative Years of the
American Legal Services Program 178-79 (1978).
94. Id. at 178-79, 189.
95. Id. at 179, 183, 189.
96. See, e.g., Notes from the November 1998 Reunion of Reggies, at
http://nejl.wcl.american.edu/regreunion.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2004) [hereinafter
Notes]. There are also contemporary legal services fellowship programs that are
designed to provide opportunities for highly-qualified law graduates to work in the
public interest. See, e.g., Equal Justice Works, Equal Justice Works Fellowship, at
http://www.napil.org/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2004); Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom LLP, Skadden Fellowship, at http://www.skadden.com/Index.cfm?contentlD=23
(last visited Oct.22, 2004); Yale Law Sch., Arthur Liman Public Interest Fellowship, at
http://islandia.law.yale.edu/liman/default.htm (last visited Oct.22, 2004).
97. Notes, supra note 96. As one Reggie stated,
[a]s Reggies we have a special duty to hold on to the vision and the courage
that made us want to be advocates for equal justice, because it is that vision,
that strength and that courage that this society must have if we are ever to
become a just society.
Id.
98. For example, Yale Law School has admitted only about 7% of those who
applied over the past three years. See Yale Law Sch., Summary of Yale Law School
Applicants for 2001, 2002, 2003, at
http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/html/Admissions/admis-jdoverview.htm. At the
University of Connecticut School of Law, roughly 6% of applicants were enrolled for
the 2004-2005 academic year. See Univ. of Conn. School of Law, Class of 2007
Profile, at http://www.law.uconn.edu/admissions/admsfin/profile.html (last visited Oct.
27, 2004).
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open profession and it screens people out beginning with admission to
law school and continuing with passage of a bar examination. The
message sent to law students is clear-"not everyone gets to do this,
and you are special because you do." Law students regularly
accumulate substantial debt for the privilege and must justify that
debt by believing that the law will give them special skills by which
they might help society, or by giving them special skills by which to
make money (with those beliefs not necessarily mutually exclusive).
Either way, the law student concludes that there is unique value in
going to law school and unique skills gained during the three years.
Law students generally are not required to take, and may not be
offered, any courses that compare lawyering skills to other
paraprofessional skills. Thus, students receive no information that
challenges their sense that the practice of law requires special skills.
Further, assuming students are required to take some kind of
professional responsibility course, it is highly unlikely that the course
will focus much on unauthorized practice of law. Only one of the
ABA's fifty-eight model rules mentions UPL.99 Students conclude
their professional responsibility course committed to the ideal of
lawyers as holding a special relationship with, and owing special duties
to, their clients. As the preamble to the ABA's Model Rules states:
"A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of
clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having a
special responsibility for the quality of justice."1" Even the most
public-interest minded law student is likely to finish law school
believing she can provide special services to the community-services
that a nonlawyer would not also be able to provide.
The legal aid community has periodically challenged itself to
reconsider the role of the lawyer in advocating for social change. For
example, there have been calls for lawyers to more effectively include
their clients and client communities in decision making, or for lawyers
to take a more holistic approach to serving their clients. 01 However,
the challenges generally consider the ways that lawyers might alter
their behaviors rather than urging lawyers to change the structural
barriers that increase the kinds of legal advocates available to clients.
For example, lawyers should be "rebellious" or they should
incorporate into their skills the methods of community organizers. 102
It is now time for legal aid lawyers to do more than change their
own methods of advocacy. It is time for legal aid lawyers to
affirmatively and assertively take on UPL restrictions as a substantive
99. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 5.5 (2004).
100. Id. at pmbl. 1 (emphasis added).
101. See Cantrell, A Short History, supra note 75, at 31-35 (summarizing some of
the more prominent calls for reform).
102. Id.; see also Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on
Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 443 (2001).
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area of law important to their clients. It will take the concerted effort
of a notable section of the bar to convince state legislatures that
nonlawyers should be permitted to provide legal services. No other
group of lawyers has demonstrated any interest in pursuing such an
agenda. If legal aid lawyers do not take on this challenge, it is likely to
remain solely a topic for academic discourse.
